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In 1924, the British recorded more births than deaths in Uganda for 
the first ime since the foundation of the Uganda protectorate in 
1900.' Civil war, smallpox, cholera, trypanosomiasis ( leeping sick- 
ness), bubonic plague, and other epidemics had combined to keep 
the recorded death rate above the recorded birth rate. But even as 
the high mortality of the trypanosomiasis epidemic fell, the popu- 
lation of this prize protectorate continued to decline. Protectorate 
officials and missionaries blamed the continued decline on sexually 
transmitted iseases (STDs), particularly syphilis. 
In retrospect, their alarm may have been unwarranted. Re- 
searchers have since argued that syphilis was confused with en- 
demic yaws and that infertility is a classic symptom of gonorrhea 
I am grateful for a Summer Research Grant from the Interdisciplinary Seminar in 
Atlantic History, Culture and Society, the Johns Hopkins University, which financed 
the research for this article in England and Uganda. Philip Curtin, David Cohen, 
Monica van Beusekom, and the members of the Johns Hopkins African History 
Seminar provided useful criticism of earlier versions of this research. 
'Annual Medical Report for the Year Ended 31 December 1924 (Entebbe: 
Government Printer, 1925), 8. 
[Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 1991, vol. 16, no. 4] 
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but not of syphilis.2 Furthermore, the population statistics available 
for the protectorate were not necessarily accurate, though the time 
from the 1890s through the 1930s was, for much of Africa, one of the 
unhealthiest periods in history.3 Nevertheless, British officials and 
missionaries perceived a crisis and acted on the basis of that 
perception. The population appeared to be decreasing in the 
centralized kingdoms most crucial to the economic viability and 
social order of the protectorate: Buganda, Bunyoro, and Toro. A 
declining population meant a labor shortage capable of threatening 
the prosperity and viability of the protectorate. It might halt the 
development of labor-intensive export crops such as cotton, which 
were necessary to rationalize the expenses of the Uganda railroad 
and the new colonial administration. Itmight threaten the stability 
of the African oligarchs who performed the day-to-day work of 
ruling Uganda. Most certainly, it would be a sign to critics in Britain 
that the colony's centerpiece Buganda, so widely acclaimed in the 
late nineteenth century as an advanced African kingdom, was being 
hurt rather than helped by its colonial link. 
British concern over the reproduction of the population and 
society of Uganda intensified from 1907 through 1924. Institutions 
and ideologies were developed to cope with an epidemic of STDs, 
to promote the family as a unit of reproduction, and to reform 
motherhood. The British colonizers and the African elite of Uganda 
built a population crisis from a collection of beliefs and data. The 
perceived severity of this crisis-and the response it evoked- 
changed over the years. That response began as a straightforward 
medical attempt to treat the ill. After the World War, though, "social 
hygiene" became an important herapeutic tool, and the adminis- 
tration worked to instill shame and to change the sexual behavior of 
individuals. At the end of the war, the administration medical 
service and its missionary allies promoted motherhood through the 
Maternity Training School (MTS) in an effort to make more women 
reproduce and to make them better mothers. And in the 1920s, the 
administration and the missions attempted to shape African family 
2 John Orley, "Indigenous Concepts of Disease and Their Interaction with 
Scientific Medicine," in Health in Tropical Africa during the Colonial Period, ed. 
E. E. Sabben-Clare, D. J. Bradley, and K. Kirkwood (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 
126-38. 
3 The protectorate government believed the population of Uganda as a whole was 
decreasing at a rate of 20,000 per annum (C0536/24/19193, 1908, Colonial Office 
[CO], Public Records Office, Kew; and K. David Patterson and Gerald W. Hartwig, 
"The Disease Factor: An Introductory Overview," in Disease in African History, ed. 
K. David Patterson and Gerald W. Hartwig [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 
1978], 4). 
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structures and private life by employing midwives trained by the 
MTS in health and education initiatives. 
Medical intervention 
From 1900 to 1920, between 250,000 and 330,000 people died of 
trypanosomiasis in Uganda in an epidemic that shocked the protec- 
torate administration into action.4 The governor authorized forced 
removals to clear people away from the tsetse flies that carried the 
disease. A series of commissions came down from London to 
discover the cause of sleeping sickness, then to develop a means of 
controlling it, and finally to assess its impact upon the protectorate's 
economy and society. By 1905, few people were living in infected 
areas, and fewer were dying of trypanosomiasis.5 The crisis was 
over. Governor Hesketh Bell could argue that the administrative 
intervention had worked. The intervention left behind, however, 
not only a group of doctors and scientists familiar with conditions in 
Uganda but also a pattern for administrative intervention in the 
health and lives of the protectorate's people by a system of local 
administration that oversaw public health, and a pattern of visiting 
medical commissions that advocated advanced and coercive thera- 
pies and population management. 
After the epidemic, though, the population continued to shrink, 
and the protectorate's administration turned its attention to the low 
birth rates reported by the most politically important regions of the 
protectorate, particularly Buganda, the protectorate's political, ed- 
ucational, and economic core. This low birth rate was blamed 
primarily on STDs, especially syphilis. So an investigating com- 
mission came to Uganda. It arrived in 1908 and set about requesting 
records on syphilis from the various doctors in the area. Doctor 
A. R. Cook of the Church Missionary Society's Mengo Hospital, the 
region's most prominent medical authority, forwarded statistics 
showing that syphilis and STDs in general were epidemic among 
the Baganda. Cook's statistics indicated that during the period 
1904-6, syphilis cases constituted between 11 percent and 14 
percent of patients at the mission hospital, and STD cases together 
4B. W. Langlands, "Sleeping Sickness in Uganda, 1900-1920," Occasional 
Paper, no. 1 (Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, 1967), 1; and D. J. 
Bradley, "The Situation and the Response," in Sabben-Clare, Bradley, and Kirk- 
wood, eds., 6-12. 
5 H. Hesketh Bell, Report on the Measures Adopted for the Suppression of 
Sleeping Sickness in Uganda (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1909), 8. 
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(including syphilis, gonorrhoea, and yaws) constituted between 18 
percent and 20 percent of inpatients. Furthermore, 22 percent of 
outpatient cases were seeking treatment for STDs. While these 
statistics were not unusually high, particularly given confusion 
between syphilis and yaws, Cook suggested a crisis by estimating 
that 70 percent of pregnancies among the Baganda ended in 
miscarriage, stillbirth, or infant death within the first week after 
birth, attributable to congenital syphilis.6 James Will, of the admin- 
istration's medical service, charged Cook with exaggeration, but the 
commission believed in an epidemic and Cook's statistics, gradu- 
ally exaggerated, became the basis of all future statements about 
the syphilis epidemic in Uganda.7 
After the massive response to the trypanosomiasis epidemic, 
medical activism seemed appropriate. F. J. Lambkin, the head of 
the investigating commission, emphasized that syphilis was just as 
important as sleeping sickness, because before trypanosomiasis, 
another malady of an even more serious nature had begun to 
sap the life-blood of the tribes. Syphilis was very prevalent in 
the protectorate, but the researches connected with sleeping 
sickness overshadowed all attention to the syphilitic out- 
break, attracted to itself all interest, and set back all investi- 
gations with regard to syphilis in that part of the world. The 
consequence was that syphilitic disease gained a firm footing 
in the protectorate, and, being left to itself, caused devasta- 
tion everywhere among the inhabitants.... In fact, as things 
stand at present, owing to the presence of syphilis, the entire 
population stands a good chance of being exterminated in a 
very few years, or left a degenerate race fit for nothing.8 
6 A. R. Cook, "VD Statistics for Col. Lambkin," December 14, 1907, in box: 
"Incoming General Correspondence, 1899, 1902-9," Albert Cook Library, Mulago 
Medical School, Makerere University, Uganda (hereafter referred to as ARCLM). 
A. R. Cook and his brother J. H. Cook were doctors with the CMS. Katherine 
Timpson came to Uganda as a nurse, married A. R. Cook, and became matron of 
Mengo Hospital. 
7 J. Will to A. R. Cook, September 25, 1908; Will to J. H. Cook, January ] 1909, 
both in ARCLM. Lambkin repeated the statistics (F. J. Lambkin, "An Outbreak oL 
Syphilis in a Virgin Soil: Notes on Syphilis in the Uganda Protectorate," in A System 
of Syphilis, ed. D'Arcy Power and J. Keogh Murphy [London: Oxford University 
Press, 1908], 2:339). The governor repeated them (H. Hesketh Bell, Glimpses of a 
Governor's Life [London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1946], 171-72), missionary 
literature used them in fund raising, and medical officers in Uganda used them to 
extract funding from the colonial office. 
8 F. J. Lambkin, "An Outbreak of Syphilis in a Virgin Soil," 339. 
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His alarm was not ignored. Before he left Uganda, Lambkin 
instructed octors in the intramuscular injection of mercury, which 
he claimed would facilitate mass treatment and mass cures. Other 
doctors with experience in the region were skeptical. Doctor Will 
asserted that when he had tried intramuscular injections twenty 
years before, the pain was so severe that he was unable to convince 
anyone to come back for a second shot and was left with an 
oversupply of an expensive medicine that no one would take.9 
Doctors A. R. and J. H. Cook also had their doubts about an 
extensive STD treatment scheme. They stalled, agreeing to coop- 
erate only years later, after the administration's assurances that 
examination and treatment would be voluntary and that the admin- 
istration would provide the technicians and drugs.'? 
Despite this local opposition, the administration, accustomed to 
the idea of massive medical intervention, saw the antisyphilis 
campaign as a real possibility. Previously, treatment of syphilis had 
been haphazard at best. Before the development of 606 (marketed 
in the United States as Salvarsan), mercury was the most effective 
treatment available for patients with syphilis." It could cure the 
disease if both doctor and patient had the patience to endure 
treatment until the cure was permanent, but patients hated its side 
effects.'2 The Lambkin method of intramuscular injection offered a
new opportunity. The intramuscular injections did not require 
patients to take pills at specified times; they put the administration 
of medication directly under the control of the medical practitioner. 
Lambkin argued that medical intervention against syphilis was 
necessary, feasible, and potentially cost-effective. Too many ac- 
tively infectious cases in young, productive adults had caused 
substantial debility to an already depleted work force.'3 All the 
commission was asking for, Lambkin emphasized, was a bit of 
money and some state help in convincing Africans to attend clinics. 
Given that, Lambkin's assistant assured the Colonial Office that in 
9 Will to A. R. Cook, September 25, 1908, ARCLM. 10 A. R. Cook to Major Keane, "Memo on discussion at the medical subconfer- 
ence," December 7, 1921, ARCLM. 
" The name 606 was the original one for the syphilis cure developed in 1908. It 
has also been called Salvarsan, Neo-Kharsivan, Sulfarsenol, NAB, arsphenamine, 
and Neo-Salvarsan (Keane, "Annual Report on VD Measures for 1921," in Annual 
Medical and Sanitary Report for Year Ended 31 December, 1921, Uganda Protec- 
torate, ed. C. A. Wiggins, Chief Medical Officer [Entebbe: Government Printer, 
1922], 66). 
12 Lambkin, "The Treatment of Syphilis," in Power and Murphy, eds., 260, 261, 
283, 296. 
13 Lambkin and Keane, November 21, 1910, C0536/38 (n. 3 above). 
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six months he could have "dealt with and cured most of the 
syphilitic sick in this country."14 
Lambkin's investigation and initiatives focused on Buganda, the 
political, economic, and religious center of the protectorate. Before 
the establishment of the protectorate, Buganda had been the most 
powerful and influential state in the region, and it retained that 
status in the twentieth century through an adroit alliance with 
British imperial power. Should Ganda power be threatened by 
depopulation, the protectorate's administration feared regional 
destabilization. The British public, educated by missionary propa- 
ganda, travelers' tales, and the debate over the Uganda railroad, saw 
Buganda as a valuable colonial possession and syphilis as a disease 
imported by the colonial expansion, so there was a substantial 
British lobby for an antisyphilis campaign.'5 The colonial office 
responded to pressure from the protectorate's administration and 
the Uganda lobby in Britain and requested 2,000 pounds sterling 
each year to fight in Buganda the disease that had been introduced 
"as one of the blessings of European Civilization."'6 
Within Buganda, the Lukiko (the Ganda Council that headed 
the Native Government of Buganda) had proved its willingness to 
legislate on health matters by enforcing compulsory smallpox 
vaccination. Hesketh Bell, who had authorized the radical inter- 
vention of the trypanosomiasis removals, agreed to begin the 
Lambkin initiative in Buganda, where he believed the Native 
Government would be willing and able to perform the necessary 
coercion.'7 The Native Government's cooperation, though, proved 
difficult to enlist. Lambkin's original scheme faltered after eighteen 
months when two of the three medical officers involved left the 
protectorate, complaining that they could not enforce notification 
and treatment without more help than they were receiving from the 
14 G. Keane, November 21, 1910, C0536/37837. Keane's statement proved ludi- 
crously optimistic. 
15 See D. A. Low, Buganda in Modern History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1971), 228-29, for a discussion of Anglo-Ganda cooperation. See ibid., 62-73, for a 
discussion of Buganda's exceptional prominence in Britain. The entire concept of 
"virgin soil" epidemic syphilis was predicated on the contemporary belief that 
Uganda had not previously been exposed to syphilis. See, e.g., Lambkin, "An 
Outbreak of Syphilis in a Virgin Soil," 339-55. 
16 Lord Crewe to Lloyd George, July 23, 1908, C0536/24. See also Comments by 
the Secretary of State, 1910, C0536/24; and Governor Hesketh Bell, April 17, 1908, 
C0536/19. 
17 Governor Hesketh Bell, April 17, 1908, C0536/19. 
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Native Government.'8 In 1913, protectorate officials complained 
that "the Natives were not playing up well" to the antisyphilis 
initiatives.'9 
Despite these setbacks, the remaining medical officer, George 
Keane, remained optimistic, and in 1913 he sought to begin the 
treatment program again, backed up by new laws and more coop- 
eration from the Native Government.20 The protectorate adminis- 
tration had declared syphilis a "Dangerous Disease" under the 
Dangerous Diseases Ordinance of 1909, and in 1913 it went further, 
suggesting that new legislation should be initiated in the Lukiko, 
and then strengthened by protectorate ordinance.21 These "Town- 
ships (Venereal Diseases) Rules, 1913" were recognizably coercive. 
Baganda could be physically forced to undergo examination, and 
when evidence of any STD was found, they were legally required 
to undergo treatment. If they stopped coming for their weekly 
syphilis shots or daily gonorrhea treatments, their local chief was 
authorized to have them hauled in for treatment. These laws were 
modeled on the controversial Contagious Diseases Acts of England 
and, like them, were enforced only selectively. Officials in Uganda 
nevertheless demanded the authority to impose medical treatment 
on the willing and unwilling alike. "Drastic laws," the governor 
argued, "are our only chance of dealing satisfactorily with what is 
now the most serious medical problem in Uganda."22 
Moral intervention 
But syphilis was not merely a medical problem. As Africans were 
diagnosed with syphilis, a disease reaching epidemic proportions 
through nonmonogamous ex, they also were diagnosed as im- 
moral. This linkage between syphilis and immorality was present 
in missionary publications from the earliest observations of syphilis 
in Uganda, despite the frequent confusion of syphilis with yaws, a 
related disease transmitted by casual contact. European observers 
18 Principal Medical Officer to Secretary of State for Colonies, May 27, 1913, 
C0536/60/22767. 
19 Colonial Office Discussion of the Medical Report of 1912, July 4, 1913, 
C0536/60. 
20 The increase in Ganda cooperation was reported by Keane, November 24, 
1913, C0536/66/43579. 
21 Colonial Office Discussion of the Medical Report of 1912, July 4, 1913, 
C0536/53; Discussion of antisyphilis legislation, C0536/60/22767. 
2 Governor [F. J. Jackson] to CO, June 2, 1913, C0536/60. 
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in 1882 already had proclaimed syphilis widespread, fertility low, 
and promiscuity common.23 Imperial observers, especially nondoc- 
tors, also disparaged Ganda morality. The women of Buganda, 
declared one imperial agent, were dissolute and poor breeders; he 
argued that the nation could be saved only through the influence of 
Christianity.24 
The earliest administrative attempts to cope with syphilis, 
though, were not laden with moral condemnation, but patterned on 
the public health measures that had attended trypanosomiasis and 
other diseases which lacked obvious moral implications. The 
protectorate's administration deleted clauses of moral condemna- 
tion from the Lukiko's version of the Venereal Diseases Legislation 
of 1913. Initially, the administration put forth its plan as merely 
another public health initiative. 
The missionaries, however, never took that position. They 
argued that penalties for spreading disease were too light under the 
new legislation.25 In 1908, even as Lambkin and the administra- 
tion's medical officers were coming up with carefully nonjudgmen- 
tal plans, A. R. Cook requested funds from the medical missionary 
auxiliary to build an isolation hospital primarily for the treatment of 
syphilis, a disease too embarrassing even to name in a mission 
publication. Innocent victims existed, he emphasized, particularly 
as the Baganda did not understand the mode of transmission. But 
for most sufferers, he would allow no excuses: "The immense 
majority have fallen ill through immorality." This did not mean that 
sufferers from syphilis should not be treated. Cook, too, empha- 
sized the danger of the nation's dying out unless its disease, 
however ill-gotten, was treated. Besides, he argued, treatment 
provided an important opportunity for evangelization and "remem- 
brance of the enormous influence of the evil surrounding them from 
birth, backed up by an hereditary tendency to do evil-for until 
Christianity was introduced, purity of home life was unknown- 
will prevent our passing a harsh judgement on the sinner, whatever 
we may think of the sin."26 
As late as the end of 1914, George Keane, the administration's 
doctor in charge of STD programs, continued to provide relatively 
optimistic reports concerning the progress of antisyphilis efforts. 
3 C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin, Uganda and the Egyptian Soudan, vol. 1, 
Uganda (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington, 1882), 150-51, 183, 
186-87. 
4 H. Harry Johnston, The Uganda Protectorate (London: Hutchinson, 1902), 
2:642. 
25 From the governor [Jackson], June 2, 1913, C0536/60/22767. 
6 A. R. Cook, "An Urgent Need in Uganda," Mercy and Truth 12 (1908): 44-50. 
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But despite the restriction of the campaign to Buganda rather than 
Uganda as a whole, even within Buganda there were more potential 
patients than could be treated.27 Keane emphasized that the STD 
program was uninterested in treating cases of syphilis that had 
proceeded beyond the actively infectious stage to the point at 
which infectiousness declines but the most painful symptoms 
began to appear. Nevertheless, 76-87 percent of the cases his team 
encountered were contagious.28 And estimates of the proportion of 
the total population affected by some form of syphilis ran as high as 
80 percent.29 By 1915, the discussion of STD in Uganda had built to 
a crescendo, and then it stopped. The problem was enormous, but 
its very magnitude had pushed it back to the position of STD 
treatment before the Lambkin investigation-that is, STD treat- 
ment was deemed important but impractical given the limited 
reach of the colonial state and the high demands of the available 
medical technology. To reach even those in Buganda who needed 
treatment, and to force them to accept painful and expensive 
treatment against their will, would require a stronger state and a 
more extensive medical system than Britain had transferred to 
Uganda. The resources necessary to make the treatment scheme 
credible were simply not available. 
During the First World War, Uganda was hit by epidemics of small- 
pox, dysentery, cerebro-spinal meningitis, and bubonic plague, fol- 
lowed after the war by influenza.30 This high morbidity and mortality 
produced acute concern in both Britain and Uganda over the vitality 
and survival of the population. As early as May 1917, the Colonial 
Office discussed the possibility of resuming anti-STD efforts inUganda 
as soon as staff could be released from wartime work.31 But when STD 
work resumed, its character changed. It was no longer a medical re- 
sponse to an epidemic. It became a moral crusade.32 
Some new medical resources for treating syphilis became avail- 
able after the war as limited supplies of 606-expensive, but more 
27 G. Keane, "Venereal Disease," November 24, 1913, C0536/66/43579; "Vene- 
real Disease," November 11, 1912, C0536/53. 
8 Lambkin and Keane, November 21, 1910, C0536/38. 
9Bell, Glimpses of a Governor's Life (n. 7 above), 171-72. 
30 A. G. Stanley-Smith, "Sir Albert Cook's Legacy," 1967, ARCLM (n. 6 above). 
31 "Antivenereal Work," May 17, 1917, C0536/98. 
32 Within Britain itself, concern over the demographic implications of changing 
patterns of motherhood and fertility also intensified during this period. Many of the 
programs developed for Uganda were implicitly or explicitly modeled on the various 
initiatives that Jane Lewis and Anna Davin have described as "imperial mother- 
hood" (see Jane Lewis, The Politics of Motherhood: Child and Maternal Welfare in 
England, 1900-1939 [London: Croom Helm, 1980]; and Anna Davin, "Imperialism 
and Motherhood," History Workshop, no. 5 [Spring 1978], 9-65). 
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effective and with fewer side effects than mercury-arrived in 
Uganda. But with the failure of the prewar campaign, and the 
disappointing accomplishments of the Native Government, even 
Keane, the head of the prewar treatment scheme, advocated a new 
strategy. The postwar approach was to have three parts: a coercive 
anti-STD campaign similar to the one before the war; a propaganda 
campaign to educate the Baganda in the dangers of immorality; and 
a motherhood campaign to train midwives and, through them, 
mothers, in an effort o lower the infant mortality rate. This was no 
mere public health initiative. It was a complex response to the 
depopulation of Uganda. It mobilized new forces in both Uganda 
and Britain in an attempt to inspire and institutionalize a new 
morality. 
The administration allowed the missionaries to take the lead in 
the new campaign and, in paying for the missionary-administered 
social purity campaign and maternal health programs, it provided 
missionaries with a highly visible platform from which to speak. 
Even before the war, missionary rhetoric on the subjects of popu- 
lation and motherhood in Uganda had been highly judgmental. 
A. R. Cook and Katherine Timpson Cook of the CMS's Mengo 
Hospital had been the primary spokespersons. They emphasized 
that the Baganda acted immorally because they had never been 
taught sexual morality. A. R. Cook decried "the entire absence of a 
national conscience against sins of immorality" and argued that, 
without education in sexual self-control, the colonial abolition of 
harsh, deterrent responses to adultery or illicit sex-such as en- 
slavement or death-left the Baganda confused amid moral anar- 
chy.33 Before the war, the Cooks had attempted to address this 
perceived lack of conscience by preaching to the ill in the isolation 
hospital. They apparently had some success, as A. R. Cook declared 
this to be rewarding work.34 
The Cooks' approach to patient selection differed from the 
state-medicine perspective the administration endorsed. The ad- 
ministration treated cases of primary and secondary syphilis that 
were actively contagious and present in relatively oung, otherwise 
healthy men and women. The Cooks treated "human wreckage ... 
those whom even their not over-scrupulous heathen friends refuse 
to receive into their huts."3 This emphasis on treating those who 
would be most transformed by the experience, rather than those 
viewed as most useful to society, exemplified the Mengo approach 
33 A. R. Cook, "An Urgent Need in Uganda" (n. 26 above), 44-50. 
34 A. R. Cook, "News from Mengo," Mercy and Truth 13 (1909): 9-13. 
35 A. R. Cook, "The Opening of the Roosevelt Block, Mengo Hospital," Mercy 
and Truth 14 (1910): 76-79. 
796 
This content downloaded from 141.166.177.252 on Mon, 28 Jul 2014 19:53:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Summer 1991 / SIGNS 
to STDs. Doctor J. H. Cook, writing in 1910, commended the 
administration's treatment centers as the only approach that the 
state could take, but asserted that the missions could do more: "I 
cannot help feeling that this ... is yet tackling the problem from the 
wrong end. I believe that it would be more scientific to tackle the 
cause, the moral cause, rather than the physical result."6 
The administration reinstated its treatment program under 
Keane, but its medical achievements were limited. Drugs were 
scarce. From April through August 1921, the administration's 
medical team had no 606, which remained the most efficient 
treatment for syphilis, yaws, and plague. Even when 606 was 
available, it was, at six shillings a dose, extremely expensive. 
Patients were most often treated instead with inefficient and 
painful mercury injections. Doses of both mercury and 606 were 
frequently halved on the assumption that Africans were more 
sensitive to drugs than Europeans, leading to patient complaints 
that they were forced to attend clinics for months because "the 
injections are not strong enough."37 Furthermore, coercion was 
becoming increasingly difficult. Women were shielded by their 
relatives, who objected when women were taken away from their 
work and families.38 Many outpatients ceased to report for weekly 
treatments as soon as their immediate symptoms ubsided, but 
before they were cured.39 And, in addition to this Ugandan resis- 
tance, the administration began to receive protests from women's 
groups in Britain objecting to compulsory examination.40 The orig- 
inal public health strategy was obviously not going to work. 
But Keane remained hopeful, announcing triumphantly in his 
1921 report that "it is a tribute to the efficiency of anti-venereal 
disease measures that at length an awakening of a sense of social 
3 J. H. Cook, "The Highest Work of Medical Missions," Mercy and Truth 14 
(1910): 310-11. 
37 Apolo Kagwa [reporting complaints] to Provincial Commissioner, December 
19, 1921, C0536/120/conf. August 26, 1922, "Venereal Disease." The expense of 606 
or even mercury provided an additional motive for lowering dosages for Africans 
(see the casebooks of Mengo Hospital [ARCLM]). 
3 Women were reportedly more difficult to compel to treatment because their 
work and domestic responsibilities were more demanding than those of male 
outpatients (Keane, "Annual Report on VD Measures for 1921" [n. 11 above]). 
39 This had always been a problem. See, e.g., Keane, November 21, 1910, 
C0536/38/37837, and "Annual Report on VD Measures for 1921." Over the years, 
though, the population of partially cured-chronic-cases accumulated. 
40 Governor Coryndon to Secretary of State, C0536/120/conf. August 26, 1922, 
"Venereal Disease." This file also contains letters and reports from the Young 
Baganda Association, and Drs. A. R. Cook, J. H. Cook, G. J. Keane, and J. Hope 
Reford (acting principle medical officer, Uganda) responding to these attacks by 
defending the treatment program. 
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shame has begun to appear."41 While still maintaining his ambiva- 
lence about the quality of treatment in the mission hospitals, Keane 
had come around to the Cooks' point of view: that the Baganda 
could best be saved through the dissemination of "ideas of domes- 
ticated existence and family life."4 
Keane convinced the administration and the colonial office that 
shame, created by the education and propaganda of the Cooks' 
Social Purity Campaign, was the most efficient means of addressing 
the problem of STDs. Some officials opposed this change in 
strategy, arguing that the state was being railroaded into paying for 
missionary expenses. But despite this lack of enthusiasm, the 
Colonial Office saw the missionaries as necessary. "In view of the 
widespread incidence of VD," stated one doubter, "I am afraid that 
little progress will be made unless the assistance of the missionary 
societies can be enlisted."43 The administration saw shame as a tool, 
but it did not view Buganda in strictly moralistic terms. 
The missionaries, in a mirror image of the administration's 
position, viewed the situation as a moral crisis, and spoke the 
rhetoric of development and demography instrumentally. They 
sought to change the "callous indifference" Baganda showed 
toward the "ravages" of syphilis.44 In missionary publications, A. R. 
Cook described his social purity speech as a set of descriptions, 
parables, and analyses that "tracked back the evil to its underlying 
moral causes.... Above all, these diseases differed from others in 
affecting the soul as well as the body."45 
The English-language draft of the speech, however, was remark- 
ably nonjudgmental. It had a moral content, and the missionaries 
delivering it certainly saw the morality of the Baganda as an issue. 
But the speech emphasized public policy and put forth patriotic 
and rational, rather than ethical or religious, arguments. It appealed 
to ethnic pride and notions of progress: "The glory of a nation is its 
people. A strong prosperous nation is a land where there are 
numerous healthy families, in which the population is growing year 
by year, and where the births greatly exceed the deaths. If Uganda 
is to be judged by these standards it is a dying nation." The speech's 
41 Keane, "Annual Report on VD Measures for 1921." 
42 Ibid. 
3 . A. G. Jarvis, "Anti-Venereal Campaign," January 5, 1922, C0536/118/6. 
44 A. R. Cook to International Women's Suffrage Association, August 26, 1922, 
C0536/120. To an extent, they may have succeeded. Note the letter from Nuwa 
Sematiba, secretary of the Young Baganda Association, in the same CO file, who 
wrote, "No matter if roads, houses, factories and railways are constructed, it will all 
be of no use if the population is disappearing." 
45 A. R. Cook, "A Social Purity Campaign in Uganda," Mercy and Truth 25 (1921): 
271-98. 
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exhortations to reform did not condemn past morals so much as 
outline the steps necessary for survival. The Cooks told the 
Baganda to discourage excessive schooling in favor of early mar- 
riage, to spread knowledge of how STDs were transmitted, and to 
accept treatment. The only explicit attempt o remake Ganda sexual 
mores was the speech's conclusion that "self-control of the young 
man or woman is the essence of the whole matter, and this can only 
be secured by parental example, by careful training from child- 
hood, and by the growth of a healthy public spirit."46 
Institutional intervention 
The STD treatment program and the social purity campaign were 
designed to reach the sexually active individual, making him or her 
healthier and more fertile. But the state did not confine its inter- 
vention to individuals. Instead, through motherhood programs and 
girls' education, it attempted to reshape families. 
The Maternity Training School (MTS), founded in 1918, grew 
from the complex and sometimes contradictory attitudes of the 
white community of the protectorate. Funded by the administration 
as a public health measure, run by the Church Missionary Society 
(CMS) for evangelical and humanitarian purposes, and initially 
governed by a board with representatives from the CMS, Catholics, 
and the administration, the MTS was intended to train teenage girls 
from all over Uganda as midwives and send them to care for women 
and their babies. The MTS was, however, rooted in a more 
profound European desire to transform African society than the 
public health efforts that responded to trypanosomiasis or STDs. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, Europeans perceived 
Ugandan mothers as incompetent. As Katherine Timpson Cook 
wrote, "Many of our dear Christian women who are quite intelli- 
gent about reading are quite ignorant about caring for their little 
ones. A great number of the new-born babies die at once, or a few 
days after, and no wonder when we remember the treatment they 
receive at birth. The little mite is dashed all over with cold water, 
not dried, placed on a large banana leaf quite naked, to finish off 
any life that may remain after the cold water and night air.... It is 
a case of 'the survival of the fittest' in Uganda."47 
46 A. R. Cook (and possibly Katherine Timpson Cook), English-language draft of 
Social Purity Campaign Speech, for delivery in Luganda, 1921, ARCLM. 47 Katherine Timpson (later Cook), "Mothers in Mengo," Mercy and Truth 4 
(1900): 219. 
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Cook's agenda as a missionary was not merely to teach women, 
but to make nurturers of these savage mothers. Some missionaries 
compared African women to animals-and found the animals supe- 
rior: "I suppose there is none other stronger than the mother- 
instinct in animals and birds," one missionary wrote, "Yet a heathen 
African mother is willing, nay, is anxious, to destroy her new-born 
baby.... Her superstitious dread ... is stronger than her human 
mother-instinct."48 African women, the missionaries believed, be- 
haved as though less than fully human. And colonial officials and 
their wives concurred, perceiving them as clumsier, stupider, and 
dirtier than African men.49 
This image of African women as less than fully human facilitated 
the STD compulsory examination and treatment programs, justify- 
ing coercive legislation of a type opposed in Britain itself by those 
who had prompted repeal of the Contagious Diseases Acts on the 
grounds that the forced examinations dehumanized women. The 
image also slowed the development of maternal health programs for 
Ganda women. Initially, attempts to cope with a declining popula- 
tion had focused on STD treatment rather than maternal health, 
partially because though the local customs concerning childbirth 
and infant care were considered harmful, they were also considered 
"more difficult to overcome than any others."50 
Yet the administration acknowledged that if it was to give 
serious attention to the problem of STD and the declining popula- 
tion, it needed to intervene in the private sphere of pregnancy, 
birth, and infant care. This intervention was highly problematic. 
Many European observers believed that outside intervention had 
corrupted African women. Syphilis itself was said to have arrived in 
Buganda through increased contact with the east, and Lambkin 
argued that Christianity transformed itinto an epidemic by setting 
women free and abolishing deterrent punishments for adultery.51 
The official medical service, despite its experience in dealing 
with epidemics, had little success in reaching women as a category 
48 R. Y. Stones, "Medical Education in Africa," Mission Hospital 30 (1926): 
81-84. 
49 E. F. Kennedy, "Life Was Seldom Dull: The Experiences of a Woman in 
Equatorial Africa," Rhodes House, Oxford MSS.Afr.s.514. 
50 Colonial Office Discussion of the Medical Report of 1912, July 4, 1913, 
C0536/60. 
51 Lambkin, "An Outbreak of Syphilis in a Virgin Soil" (n. 7 above), 343-44. 
Buganda's contacts with the outside world had expanded radically during the 
nineteenth century through interactions with Swahili traders from the east coast, 
military forces from the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, railway workers from as far away as 
India, and European imperial agents, adventurers, traders, and missionaries. 
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of patients with special needs. Women's relatives shielded them 
from the compulsory examination, notification, and treatment pro- 
grams. Even when found, women were difficult o treat. Because 
they had more domestic responsibilities than men, their absence 
from home during inpatient treatment caused serious domestic 
problems.52 
Male doctors and their male assistants ran the STD programs, 
and their control made the work morally suspect. African women 
avoided the programs and British women deplored them. Some 
British women's organizations and many Baganda saw them as 
treating women like prostitutes. Regardless of how women actually 
were treated, this image exacerbated the unwillingness of Baganda 
women to go to the centers for treatment and suggested to some 
Europeans that intervention might be undermining the morals of 
African women.53 The CMS medical subconference sent Keane a 
list of treatment guidelines that emphasized propriety. Missionaries 
were not to examine anyone except with consent, and women were 
to be examined by a female inspector. The resignation of the 
administration's only female doctor, Margaret Lamont, sparked off 
protests from English groups that had fought against the English 
Contagious Diseases Acts in the 1870s and 1880s.54 
The missionaries' role as intermediaries between the European 
community and women with babies quieted this type of criticism. 
And the missionaries had powerful motivations for stepping into 
this role. Philosophically, they approved of programs designed to 
help Africans and serve the African as "an end in himself."55 
Missionaries observed that "the mothers are really attached to their 
little ones, and their grief is very touching when they die, and yet 
52 Keane, "Annual Report on VD Measures for 1921" (n. 11 above), 67-68. 
53 Unlike contagious diseases programs in England (see Judith Walkowitz, 
Prostitution and Victorian Society [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980]), India (see Kenneth Ballhatchet, Race, Sex, and Class under the Raj [New 
York: St. Martin's, 1980]), and South Africa (see Charles van Onselen, "Prostitutes 
and Proletarians, 1886-1914," in Studies in the Social and Economic History of the 
Witwatersrand, 1886-1914 [New York: Longman, 1982], 103-62), the Ugandan 
program was not aimed specifically at prostitution. More men than women were 
examined, and the emphasis was on safeguarding fertility rather than on policing 
loose women. See, for discussions of this policy, "Venereal Diseases" file, August 26, 
1922, C0536/120/conf. 
u A. R. Cook to Keane, "Memo on discussion at the medical subconference," 
December 7, 1921, ARCLM (n. 6 above); "Venereal Disease," August 26, 1922, 
C0536/120/47470/conf.; and Walkowitz. 
55 J. H. Oldham, "The Population Question in Africa" (1926), 33-34, in box 206, 
Documents of the Conference of the British Mission Societies/International Mis- 
sionary Council (CBMS/IMC), School of Oriental and African Studies, London. 
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the infant mortality is so high."6 The Maternity Training School 
trained midwives to help individual women bear and keep alive the 
children they desperately wanted. By decreasing maternal mortal- 
ity and increasing women's chances of having nonsyphilitic hil- 
dren, the MTS was working to prevent suffering. Furthermore, 
women had long been an important part of the missionary program. 
Women missionaries participated in medicine and evangelism 
even before trained nurses arrived in 1897, and their presence 
calmed fears about the moral difficulties of treating women who 
suffered from STDs. These women argued that action was neces- 
sary, but that "it is useless tackling the problem merely from the 
men's point of view. The women must be taught and helped."57 
The missionaries' push for a maternal health program in Uganda 
was also highly practical. The CMS maternity program mobilized 
new financial resources for medical missionary work during a 
period of fiscal crisis. Women and children were perceived as 
worthy of help, and individuals, organizations, and governments 
both within Uganda and beyond contributed to fund the MTS.5 In 
the larger community of colonial Africa, the MTS trained the initial 
faculty of Lady Griggs's Maternity Training School in Kenya, and 
visiting commissions praised the MTS program enthusiastically.59 
This widespread support translated into funding from both official 
and private sources, part of which helped finance the rest of the 
medical mission's programs.6 
This support meant more than just money. It also gave mission- 
aries a privileged niche within the increasingly secular and formal 
colonial power structure of Uganda. In providing the mission with 
a medical specialty that the state found difficult o manage, the 
maternity program prevented the medical aspect of missionary 
work from becoming redundant as state-sponsored medical services 
6 A. Bond, "Toro Hospital and the Work There," Mercy and Truth 19 (1915): 
397-406. Grief from infant mortality and childlessness is a major theme of the 
medical literature. There is no evidence of married women choosing contraception, 
abortion, or infanticide. 
57 "The Lady Coryndon Maternity Training School" (1925?) Box 206, CBMS/ 
IMC. 
58 Testimonials to MTS (1920?), box: "Incoming General Correspondence (In- 
cluding MTS), 1919-21, 1925-30," ARCLM. 
59 The MTS received approval from, among others, the East Africa Commission 
and the various Phelps-Stokes Commissions (minutes, July 6, 1925, "Minute book of 
the Lady Coryndon Maternity Training School Committee," vol. 2, 1923-54 [A. R. 
Cook, Secretary], ARCLM). 
60 See, e.g., J. H. Cook to A. R. Cook, May 22, 1925, box: "Mengo Hospital 
Incoming Correspondence from CMS London, October 1919-32," ARCLM. 
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expanded. The mission acquired an official role as the only trainer 
of midwife candidates for the administration's certifying exam.6' 
The CMS supervisors in London applauded this as a master stroke, 
ensuring missionaries access to Africans even as the administrative 
structure was secularized.62 And later in the midwives' careers, the 
mission, as their sponsor, could instruct state officials on how these 
women were to be managed and their practices promoted.6 
The maternal health program of Uganda was a joint venture 
between the state and its missionary subcontractor, two groups with 
different agendas but overlapping interests. The program was 
designed to suit everyone involved. For the administration, it was 
a bureaucratic response to high rates of maternal and infant mor- 
tality. The mission-run maternity system was to consist of a school 
for the training of African midwives (the MTS) and the maternity 
centers throughout he country, to which trained and certified 
midwives would be sent. An inspector from the MTS would 
supervise standards of technique, hygiene, and morals in the 
outlying centers. Ideally, the centers were to be supported by the 
patient fees, though midwives were guaranteed a salary from either 
the administration or the sponsoring mission. The midwives within 
the centers would provide prenatal care, deliver the babies, and 
teach new mothers how to care for their infants. 
The missionaries wanted to do more than stabilize the popula- 
tion by facilitating live births. Hoping to produce salvation as well 
as treatment, hey emphasized the Christian education of midwives 
and mothers and cultivated the role of the midwife as a moral 
exemplar for her community. Midwives were to live the propa- 
ganda that the social purity campaign delivered as rhetoric. Kather- 
ine Timpson Cook and A. R. Cook saw each midwife as a potential 
light shining in the wilderness, delivering medical, moral, and 
religious enlightenment to her flock. The Catholic missions were so 
impressed by the evangelical potential of the idea that by 1924 they 
withdrew their support from the CMS maternity program and 
began one of their own at Nsambya, headed by Mother Kevin.64 
61 "Constitution of the Maternity Training School," July 1920, box: "Incoming 
General Correspondence (Including MTS) 1919-21, 1925-30," ARCLM. 
62 H. D. Hooper to Katherine Cook, April 22, 1930, ARCLM. 
63 Form letters: A. R. Cook to Police Commissioners; A. R. Cook to Ssaza chiefs 
(English translation), both in box: "Incoming General Correspondence (Including 
MTS), 1919-21, 1925-30," ARCLM. 
4 Mother Kevin, "Report of MTS, 1924, Nsambya," in Annual Medical Report for the Year Ending 31 December 1924 (n. 1 above), 21-22. 
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Back in England, the maternity program was an enormous 
public relations uccess. The MTS published progress reports with 
touching stories about the happy mothers who survived childbirth 
and whose babies lived, saved by the midwives' care. Pictures 
showed midwives lined up, clean and smiling in their uniforms. 
And by 1924, the recorded birth rate did surpass the recorded death 
rate in most regions of the protectorate, including Buganda. 
Privately, however, the midwives' sponsors were more ambiva- 
lent. The tiny excess of births over deaths was not necessarily the 
result of STD treatment or midwives' care. In 1926, despite the 
rapid expansion of midwife training, only about 2,000 of 16,000 live 
births registered in Buganda were attended by certified midwives.65 
In the protectorate as a whole, MTS-trained midwives were even 
scarcer, and sometimes deliberately avoided by potential patients.6 
Furthermore, the moral and social agenda of the maternity pro- 
grams encountered significant problems. The midwives were 
young women who were given an education, selected to play a 
leadership role, and then sent into communities where their new 
education isolated them. The missionaries, and even the more 
sympathetic MTS committee, were appalled whenever a midwife 
stepped beyond her sermonizing role and attempted to establish 
either equality with the European missionaries in whose stations 
she worked or membership in a local community through a liaison 
with a local man. Both responses constituted rejections of the 
MTS's emphasis on deference and Christian morality. 
The relationship between the midwives and their European 
sponsors was complex and contradictory. Propaganda disseminated 
in England lauded midwives as potential saviors of their race. They 
were portrayed as prototypes for a new African womanhood, one 
"doing yeoman service to their country women and children," as 
each maternity center became "a potential centre of light and 
learning."67 These new women saved infants, rather than merely 
watching them die. Privately, however, within Uganda, this praise 
65 Minutes, February 8, 1926, "Minute book of the Lady Coryndon Maternity 
Training School Committee," vol. 2, 1923-54 (A. R. Cook, Secretary), ARCLM. 
66 Isabel Servin to Katherine Cook, August 12, 1920, box: "Incoming General 
Correspondence (Including MTS), 1919-21, 1925-30," ARCLM. Neither Servin 
nor the others reporting problems explain why some women chose to avoid 
midwives. Possible explanations include expense, fear of moral condemnation, and 
distrust of colonial innovations. 
67 "Report of the Lady Coryndon Maternity Training School" in "CMS Medical 
Missions in Uganda, 1920," PPR/COO/L1, Contemporary Medical Archives (CMA), 
Wellcome Institute, London. 
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was qualified. Missionaries and officials alike saw midwives not as 
rational adults, but as fragile, morally suspect, impractical girls. 
Katherine Timpson Cook habitually censored the mail of student 
midwives at the MTS, weeding any letter she saw as a "direct 
incitement o immorality." Sexual activity, or pregnancy, abruptly 
ended "many promising careers," as it was evidence for expulsion 
on the grounds of "moral lapses."6 
This close supervision did not end with certification. Midwives 
continued to be treated as minors even after graduation. Katherine 
Timpson Cook and her successors inspected each Maternity 
Center on a regular basis. These inspectors mothered the mid- 
wives sternly, attempting to provide emotional support and to 
ensure that moral standards and medical practice were up to 
expectations. The mission also asked the Native Government o 
provide midwives with male guardians who were to protect them 
and to collect fees from patients, providing a monthly accounting 
to the MTS committee.69 And midwives were supposed to defer to 
European missionaries. Too much pride or independence was 
considered dangerous. Missionaries complained when the mid- 
wives proved difficult to dominate, requesting official MTS 
scoldings for the offenders.70 
More than just scolding midwives for alleged disrespect, moral 
lapses, or laziness, the MTS committee could ask the administra- 
tion to take them off the list of registered midwives. Katherine 
Timpson Cook and A. R. Cook came to the defense of one of the 
school's brightest students, who was accused of insubordination, 
and noted that her censure had been arbitrary and that her side of 
the story had been ignored.7' Yet censure and subsequent expulsion 
were the most powerful tools available to the MTS in its attempts to 
ensure that its midwives continued not merely as competent med- 
ical practitioners but also as moral models. After several disputed 
cases of moral lapses, the committee stated as policy that, follow- 
ing a conviction, the midwife would either lose her professional 
8 From Katherine Cook, Letter, December 23, 1929; J. H. Cook to A. R. Cook, 
June 30, 1921, both in box "A: Copy Letters from AR Cook, B: Cook family letters," 
ARCLM. For a sample of officials' opinions, see the discussion of the Midwives 
Ordinance of 1922, April 27, 1922, C0536/118/230. 
69 Form Letter, A. R. Cook to Ssaza chiefs (English Translation), box: "Incoming 
General Correspondence (Including MTS), 1919-21, 1925-30," ARCLM. 
70 Pilgrim to Katherine Cook, June 20, 1921, box: "Incoming General Correspon- 
dence (Including MTS), 1919-21, 1925-30," ARCLM. 
71 Minutes, April 7, 1923, "Minute book of the MTS Committee," vol. 2, 1923-54 
(A. R. Cook, Secretary), ARCLM. 
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status or, if suitably repentant, be suspended for a year, retrained at 
the MTS, and reassigned with a lower salary.72 
The minute book of the MTS committee relates a history of 
struggle and conflict over the independence of the midwives from 
the authority of school, mission, or state and over prescribed moral 
and sexual behavior. When midwives talked back to missionaries, 
took vacations from their stations, or married according to custom- 
ary practice, they were seen as rejecting the tight, narrowly pre- 
scribed role of the deferential, self-denying professional imagined 
by the program's ponsors. As long as the midwives were compe- 
tent, this independence did not threaten their medical function. 
But independence challenged the social agenda of the maternity 
program. Midwives with moral lapses might be able to treat 
syphilis and deliver babies, but if they did not act as agents of 
imperial morality, they would be no more than a partial success for 
their sponsors. Midwives were trained, but they proved to be active 
mediators between their home cultures and the culture they had 
been taught rather than passive mouthpieces for the gospels of 
morality and motherhood. This annoyed their sponsors. As one 
complained, "The best scholars [midwives] did not always possess 
the most stable moral characters. Many of them came from homes of 
doubtful virtue. The anxious question was not so much 'would 
some fall' as 'would any stand.' "73 The midwives proved too 
indirect and weak a tool for social transformation. 
Social engineering 
The British tended to view women as the spiritual, moral, and 
reproductive centers of families. As faith, morality, and fertility 
became important to colonial policy, officials, missionaries, and 
medical practitioners began to address women's health and educa- 
tion seriously. In the early stages of the colonial encounter, women 
had been deemed irrelevant o knowledge, production, and war- 
the issues that concerned early explorers and exploiters. But by the 
1920s, in the midst of an underpopulation crisis, reproduction and 
families were vital to colonial policy. From attempts to treat the 
undifferentiated mass of the sick, efforts to ensure the reproduction 
and survival of the Baganda grew into major initiatives in social 
72 Minutes, January 10, 1924, "Minute book of the MTS Committee," vol. 2, 
1923-54 (A. R. Cook, Secretary), ARCLM. 
73 A. R. Cook, "Report of LCMTS, 1925," in Annual Medical and Sanitary Report 
for the Year Ending 31 December 1925 (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1926), 
24-27. 
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engineering. Officials and missionaries became increasingly intru- 
sive as they examined bodies for lesions, condemned the moral 
state of sufferers and demanded repentance, and then combined 
bodily care and reproductive vangelism in the maternity program. 
The emphasis remained upon the public issues of the protec- 
torate's political, social, and economic viability. But the treatment 
of STDs, the social purity campaign, and subsequent maternity 
programs explicitly turned what had been private concerns regard- 
ing health, morality, and fertility into matters of public policy and 
public responsibility. In Uganda, the state bypassed African fami- 
lies, aimed treatment and propaganda at individuals, and worked to 
create new, colonial families from the building blocks of mothers 
and children produced by the midwife and joined together through 
a moral education. These new families were designed specifically 
for the reproduction of an imperial structure threatened by repro- 
ductive failure. They were agencies of the state, cultivated for their 
effects on political stability and economic development. In attempt- 
ing to seize this control over reproduction, the colonial state was in 
some sense proposing to reconstruct his African society from the 
individual upward through a policy that was social engineering 
incarnate, the antithesis of its explicit ideology of Indirect Rule. By 
promoting fertility, the administration sought to acquire taxpaying 
subjects and a labor force. By promoting a new motherhood and 
attempting to reinforce social ties threatened through economic and 
political change, it endeavored to make itself self-perpetuating. 
Through this paternalistic program that integrated biomedical and 
ideological initiatives into an attempted comprehensive recon- 
struction of the African population, the administration sought to 
sustain the Ganda oligarchy and avoid labor shortages, internal 
dissention, or open rebellion by Africans faced with impending 
physical or sociocultural extinction. The social programs of the 
protectorate were not mere sideshows to the public politics and 
economic maneuvering of imperialism. They were integral to the 
holding of power. 
Department of History 
Johns Hopkins University 
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